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As a strategy to make real estate development accountable to local
neighborhoods, community coalitions and developers are increasingly
signing Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs), legally binding contracts
through which developers agree to provide benefits to affected communi-
ties in exchange for the coalition's support when a project reaches the local
legislature for approval.' The CBA concept originated with the Los Angeles
Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) and has been used extensively in
California.2 Over time, CBAs have come to be used in other states and have
incorporated various community benefits, including first source hiring,
living wage agreements, affordable housing assistance, open space expan-
sion and environmental improvements. In New York City, all but one of the
CBAs have been negotiated by informal and unincorporated coalitions of
community groups. This has been the norm in other states as well.
The one instance of creating a separately incorporated entity to negoti-
ate a CBA brought to light a number of advantages to formally incorporat-
ing and structuring the negotiating entity. The purpose of the article is not
to argue that a separate corporation is preferable in all instances but rather
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to encourage consideration of this approach and to examine and demystify
some of the structuring issues.
1. Background: Unincorporated Coalitions
and Separate Corporations
Many of the CBAs have been negotiated by coalitions that may represent
dozens of groups. When construction of the Los Angeles Staples Center was
proposed, for example, along with two hotels, two apartment buildings, a
retail complex, a 7,000-seat theater and a 250,000-square foot expansion for
the convention center, the CBA was negotiated by the Figueroa Corridor
Coalition, which represented more than thirty community organizations,
including environmental groups, church groups, health organizations, and
immigrants' and tenants' rights groups.3 The coalition that responded to the
expansion of LAX airport in Los Angeles claimed twenty-two community
groups as members, including organizations representing community, reli-
gious, environmental, and labor interests as well as two school districts.4
Several of the CBAs devised in connection with New York City proj-
ects have been negotiated by relatively small numbers of groups and this
has led to criticism. For example, the first New York CBA, completed in
2005 in connection with the Atlantic Yards basketball arena development,
was negotiated by only eight community groups and has been alleged to
be "inherently undemocratic" because organizations whose constituencies
were citywide or statewide rather than community-based were the pri-
mary signers and some of them were receiving funds from the developer.5
The 2006 Bronx Terminal Market CBA, which allegedly did not involve any
grass roots community organizations, was signed by only three groups.6
These criticisms highlight the importance of an inclusive and well orga-
nized group to pursue the negotiations. Structuring efforts early on can
significantly bolster the credibility and perhaps the long-term success of
the effort.
It was with those lessons in mind that Manhattan's Community Board 97
began an effort, just after the Bronx Terminal Market agreement, to respond
to a massive project to expand the Columbia University campus in West
Harlem. It was decided that a separately incorporated entity, the West Har-
lem Local Development Corporation, would be formed to undertake the
negotiation. One impetus for this was the desire to potentially involve gov-
ernment entities such as elected representatives and the community board
who could not legally sign onto a CBA on their own. Another factor that
encouraged the separate incorporation was a desire for the kind of cred-
ibility that the Brooklyn and Bronx efforts failed to achieve.
The West Harlem LDC has also been criticized,8 but the criticisms are
not the result of using a corporate structure. In fact, the process of creat-
ing the corporate structure through detailed by-laws may make the group
more resistant to criticism and perhaps more resilient and transparent be-
cause a great deal of attention was given to encouraging and structuring
participation. In weekly meetings beginning in September 2006, the initial
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board of the corporation spent part of nearly every meeting grappling
with how to expand the board (defining categories of directors and con-
sidering recruitment), how the board and members should vote on impor-
tant issues, and how to respond to input from the community members
who attended the public portions of the meetings.
The board eventually expanded to twenty-five members and work by
numerous subcommittees laid the groundwork for negotiations with Co-
lumbia. The denouement arrived more quickly than expected, however,
and a detailed CBA was not signed. Instead, a memorandum of under-
standing (MOU) was signed by the West Harlem LDC and Columbia Uni-
versity on December 19, 2007, and the $7 billion project was approved by
the New York City Council the same day in a thirty-five acre rezoning deci-
sion. The MOU calls for Columbia to grant $150 million to residents of the
area during the next twelve years with $76 million to a flexible benefit
fund; $50 million to in-kind services, including $30 million toward a school
for kindergarten through eighth grade; $20 million for a housing fund; and
$4 million for legal services to help those displaced by the development.9
In late January, a West Harlem LDC board member is quoted as saying that
"the LDC is in the process of drafting a full CBA," 10 but the absence of a
full CBA at the time of the Council vote on the rezoning is a source of great
concern for advocates of the CBA concept" in general and neighborhood
residents in particular. 12 An MOU is not an enforceable document and, in
addition, now that it is signed, the LDC may have less leverage to negotiate
the details missing from this rather abbreviated document.
When CBAs are signed by the individual organizations making up a
coalition, the agreement allows each signing organization to enforce it. As
one commentator has indicated, this approach "makes clear to each orga-
nization the legal reality that it must live up to the CBA's commitments." 3
Another concern is that:
few coalitions have structured systems for determining who are official
members, and who can speak or act on their behalf. (Such systems would
be set out in bylaws or similar documents.) This uncertainty could cause
problems if an unincorporated coalition were the legal entity that signed
a CBA.'4
On the other hand, adopting carefully considered by-laws could elimi-
nate this concern.
Of course, developing a structured system for decision-making through
by-laws can be time-consuming and may distract energy from negotiat-
ing for the benefits. Depending on the timeframe for the project, this may
be a huge consideration. However, credibility in the community and even
with the developer may be enhanced by a clear and carefully considered
decision-making structure. In addition, linking groups through a new en-
tity and detailed by-laws may be a way of responding to the increasing
concern that developers will "dilute or co-opt" CBA efforts by "peel[ing]
off part of a community base." 5 It also may make on-going monitoring of
the project during construction more effective. While community groups
involved in a coalition may return to other business after the signing of a
CBA, board members of a corporation that signs a CBA and afterwards has
the sole purpose of monitoring it may be more effective in holding devel-
opers to their promises.
Therefore, if by-law models were available for incipient groups to re-
view and structuring options were more easily accessible, the extent of the
distraction could be minimized and the advantages of a separate entity
might outweigh the disadvantages. To that end, the remainder of this ar-
ticle reviews the most difficult structuring issues and possible resolutions.
II. Types of Corporations
A not-for-profit corporation would be the appropriate vehicle for the
separate entity and these may be easier to form in some states than oth-
ers.16 Some states may also have special types of not-for-profit corporations
that provide advantageous tax or other benefits. In New York, for example,
the not-for-profit corporation law allows for a special type called a local
development corporation, which may sell property more easily than other
not-for-profits 17 and may receive property from the city or county without
appraisal, public notice. or public bidding. 8 It is beyond the scope of this
article to review the not-for-profit statutes or analyze possible federal tax
exemption issues, but numerous commentators have done so outside of the
CBA context. 9
A. By-Laws
The content of by-laws may also vary from state to state, depending
on restrictions in the local statute, but most of the issues will be univer-
sal and the statutory outlines will be very similar. The structuring issues
that are particularly crucial to creating the impression that there is broad
participation and fair balance of power in decision-making concern board
composition and decision-making rules.
B. Boards of Directors
1. Who Selects the Board?
Most state statutes allow at least certain types of not-for-profit corpo-
rations the option of existing without members, sometimes referred to as
optionality by not-for-profit law commentators.20 The New York Not-for-
Profit Corporation Law, for example, states that "a corporation shall have
one or more classes of members or, in the case of a Type B corporation, may
have no members .... ,21 The Type B corporation in New York is the typical
"charitable, educational, religious" variety.22 The option to operate without
members allows the corporation's organizers to select an initial board and
provide in the by-laws for that board to select the next board, an approach
which is referred to as the self-perpetuating board. This approach may
make sense for a corporation providing a service to recipients who may not
need or want to be involved in the governance of the organization, such as
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those providing food or shelter to homeless people, but when community
input is crucial to the success and mission of the organization, it seems clear
that the board must be designated by someone other than the individuals
currently serving on the board. In addition, some special types of corpora-
tions (like New York's local development corporations) may be required by
statute to have members.' In the CBA context, having members can be a
potent organizing tool because the by-laws can also provide that the mem-
bers must ratify the CBA itself.
Once the corporation has decided that there must be members who will
select the board and presumably have other powers as well, two tiers of
power within the organization have been established and there are myriad
options to consider. At the one extreme, the by-laws can provide that the
members are the directors, which certainly minimizes the effect of hav-
ing the two tiers because the same people or organizations are filling both
roles. On the other end of the spectrum, every resident of a certain zip code
could be considered a member. Although it seems appealing to mimic the
democratic system and empower all residents, there are practical prob-
lems with this approach because such an approach may make it difficult to:
(1) determine who is a member for the purpose of establishing a quorum,
and (2) actually establish a quorum if members are not motivated to par-
ticipate. Without a quorum, the corporation can be stymied in efforts to
elect a board, amend by-laws, and take other significant corporate actions.
A middle ground may be to designate certain interest groups and existing
community groups as members who will nominate representatives for the
board.
An organization can seek diverse input for its activities and decisions
by establishing a large board of directors, a large pool of members, nu-
merous committees, or all three. The goal, which is much easier said than
done, should be to create a workable mix of these subgroups by avoiding:
(1) boards that are too small to represent the community or too large to
be manageable, (2) member bodies that are too small to have an impact
or too big to keep track of and actually convene, and (3) too few commit-
tees to make the effort worthwhile or too many committees to monitor. In
determining how big is unmanageable, it should be noted that unwieldy
board sizes can be tempered somewhat by limiting numbers of meetings;
thus, a large board may meet once every few months and may designate an
executive committee to handle matters arising in the interim. In short, enti-
ties considering negotiation of a CBA should think carefully about using a
membership structure creatively to maximize the organization's potential.
2. Board Composition-Representatives
of Existing Organizations
Consistent involvement by the same individual directors is important,
so if an organization is the member, it is optimal if the organization desig-
nates a representative who regularly attends board meetings. Alternates
may be allowed,24 but the advantages for the member organization must
be weighed against the impact on the board's cohesiveness. Put simply, re-
explaining and re-discussing issues because new personalities are present
may slow down the development of the CBA.
One of the big questions, of course, is which existing organizations to in-
clude and how many representatives they deserve. Some organizations may
be significant enough in the community to warrant two representatives on
the board of directors. Whether to allow politicians to designate representa-
tives must also be considered carefully. Such representatives would be serv-
ing as part of their jobs and may have more time and resources to commit,
but a corporation dominated by politicians may encounter criticism. The
negotiation with Columbia, for example, was accused of removing the de-
bate from "full control of the community, by people from the political sector
getting involved." 25 Another article pointed out that of the fifteen signers
on the MOU, seven are representatives of elected officials. 26 On the other
hand, two are from the local community board, the most grass roots level
of representation in the city, and the others are representatives of an array
of city, state and federal officials who were elected by the voters and who
may not all support the developer inherently. It is probably wise, though,
at least to limit the numbers of elected official representatives to 20 percent
of the board or less.
3. Board Composition-Representatives of Unorganized Groups
The organizers of the new entity may identify a need for input from com-
munity members concerned or especially knowledgeable about issues such
as education, historic preservation, or environmental impacts, and there
may not be an obvious organization that can adequately represent these
interests. In theory, there should be a way for small groups or individuals
with these interests to designate a representative, but in practice it can be
very difficult to create a fair process. The West Harlem LDC arranged a
nomination night for these unorganized groups that was publicized on its
website, in newspapers, and via e-mail listservs. Careful thought must be
given to how nominees are selected by their interest groups in such a one-
night event. In particular, what proof can be required of alignment with the
interest group? Will a list of potential nominees somehow be announced
or narrowed beforehand? Will any absentee voting by petition, proxy, or
conference phone be allowed? These questions could be answered in the
by-laws, but it may be more practical not to incorporate such a level of de-
tail in the by-laws in order to give the board some flexibility. On the other
hand, the absence of written guidance on nominating these individuals
may seem less transparent. One compromise is to insist that the board vote
on a written resolution that details the nomination procedures.
Organizers may identify quite a number of specialty areas/unorganized
interest groups as well as many organized groups whose involvement
would be desirable but who will take some time to recruit. Therefore, an
initial board of a respectable size should be identified in the certificate of
incorporation, as most states require,27 and the by-laws should provide for
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an expansion mechanism. A supermajority vote for new directors may be
important to avoid accusations that the initial board easily added their own
friends and colleagues. The West Harlem LDC had twenty-five directors
during the intense period of negotiation with Columbia and began with
five. If there is concern about all directors changing at election time, terms
can be staggered so that some directors end their board service in odd years
and others in even years. This technique is a useful way to balance the need
for continuity with the need for new input.
4. Voting Process
In drafting the by-laws, the types of actions on which the board and
members will vote must be identified and careful consideration must be
given to what percentage of members or directors must agree to each. In
addition, the by-laws should be certain to clarify whether it is a percent-
age of all directors or members (including or excluding vacancies) or only
those attending the meeting. The crucial decisions will be: (1) adding direc-
tors or filling vacancies, (2) amending the by-laws, (3) removing directors,
and (4) approving the CBA or portions of it. These four categories warrant
greater involvement in decision-making, which may mean that they should
be member decisions or decisions of more than a majority of directors. Or-
ganizers should be wary, however, of setting too high of a quorum thresh-
old, which could make it too difficult to hold meetings even to decide minor
issues, such as setting meeting dates and designating subcommittees. 28
5. Meeting Notice
Generally, the by-laws may dispense with notice for board meetings if
they occur on a set schedule.29 If notice is given, the state statute is likely
to allow a great deal of flexibility so that day-to-day operations are not
impeded. In New York, for example the by-laws may prescribe the type of
notice, which could be a phone call or an e-mail, and no particular number
of days is specified.3 As the board grows, however, the risk of alienating
directors who did not receive notice increases and greater care should be
taken. West Harlem LDC met every Tuesday at the same time and location
for sixteen months, only notifying directors of cancellations and changes.
This is a simple approach if the same location can be used and if few cancel-
lations are expected.
Member meetings, which are expected to be less frequent, require bet-
ter notice, generally in writing and at least ten days before the meeting.31
Member meetings, therefore, can become a tool for the corporation to use
when it hopes for greater transparency and unassailability, as in adoption
of the CBA.
6. Removal of Directors
Generally directors can be removed with or without cause but, in New
York for example, removal without cause must be done by the members.32
Even if the state statute does not require such a provision, organizers of the
corporation may want to consider requiring in the by-laws that the director
be given an opportunity to respond to the alleged reasons. Needless to say,
these decisions can be complicated and rife with potential for criticism.
7. Committees
Because CBA's attempt to address such an assortment of community
needs, subcommittees may be very important to encourage careful atten-
tion to and study of an issue. While it is tempting to organize these with one
director and a number of nondirectors, it is worth considering whether
this important work should be done by a subcommittee with a majority
of board members.
As mentioned earlier in the context of board size, consideration should
also be given to authorizing an executive committee to undertake some of
the corporation's activities in between board meetings.
III. Conclusion
All these by-laws issues may be distilled to two questions: who should
be involved in what decisions and how can their involvement be facili-
tated? In a CBA negotiation, the answers to these questions can be crucial
both to the quality of the end product and to the support that is garnered in
the community. It seems that some discussion of these decisions is essential
and, if the discussion can be focused, by-laws and procedures can result.
On the other hand, if existing community groups pursue a CBA negotia-
tion without giving thought to creating a separate entity, the opportunity
to tackle some of the balance of power issues at the outset may be lost.
Therefore, when time allows, some consideration should be given to the
notion of a separate entity and careful thought should be given to how to
define the "community" to be benefited and how to make sure that their
input can be facilitated.
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